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IT TAKES MORE THAN CHEEK
TO LOSE OUR WAY*
LAWRENCE J. Foxtt

It was just in August 2001 that the American Bar
Association (ABA) House of Delegates resoundingly rejected the
idea of turning lawyers into whistleblowers against their clients.
By a resounding 2-1 vote, the representatives of the American
bar, "in Congress assembled," let the world know in no uncertain
terms that the leadership of the profession put a much higher
value on client confidentiality-and the good that comes from
guaranteeing this core value of our profession by encouraging
clients to trust us and tell us all-than they placed on the notion
that lawyers should be free to disclose client fraud. The debate
was full. Some thought it was our finest hour. The result was
never in doubt, and it was affirmed again in February 2002
when the same house adopted the final version of the Revised
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Now in the wake of the Enron debacle, the President of the
ABA appointed the Commission on Corporate Governance (the
"Commission"), chaired by James Cheek, the former Chair of the
Business Law Section and a respected and renowned corporate
lawyer from Tennessee.
President Hirshon filled the
Commission with a wonderfully distinguished, but not anything
near representative, group of lawyers, most of whom call the
Business Law Section their ABA home. That Commission,
despite the fact that the ink was not yet dry on the Revised
Model Rules, has recommended, along with a whole host of
f These remarks were delivered by the author in an address at ENRON & ITS
AFTERMATH SYMPOSIUM held at St. John's University School of Law in the fall
of 2002.
tt The author is a partner at the law firm Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP in
Philidelphia. From 1990 to 1997, he was a member of the American Bar Association
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, and from 1996 to
1997, he was Chair of that committee. The author has also lectured and authored
extensively in the field of professional responsibility and ethics.
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statutory proposals, that the ABA not only revisit the snitch
provisions it just rejected but also go further than that. The
Commission actually recommended that the ABA turn the
discretion to breach confidentiality contained in the August 2001
proposals to a mandatory reporting rule for the profession.1
Lawyers would be required to disclose client frauds in which
2
their services have been employed.
One would expect, if this were the Cheek Commission's
proposal, that the profession would be presented with a body of
clear and convincing evidence demonstrating why this change
should occur. One would expect that the Commission would
establish why Enron and its progeny prove that the ABA was
wrong when it acted in such a definitive way by rejecting calls
for mandatory disclosure.
But one searches the Commission's report in vain for
anything like what one would expect. Rather we are told
categorically-yet with no citations and no examples-that it is a
"clear failure of corporate responsibility when outside ...
lawyers, who have important roles in our system of independent
checks on corporate management, fail to avert or even discoverand sometimes actually condone or contribute toward the
3
creation of-the grossest of financial manipulation and fraud."
That is a quote. The only thing I omitted are four words:
"outside directors," "auditors and."4 The reason I did that is
because, if the Commission is going to make charges about
lawyer conduct, the charges have to stand on their own. If they
do not, then they should never have seen the printed page.
Of course, on its face, it can be seen that the quoted sentence
does not parse. Rather, like so many others,5 this Commission
1 American Bar Association, PreliminaryReport of The American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility 2002 A.B.A. 24-32 [hereinafter ABA
Report], available at http://www.abanet. org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/preliminaryreport.pdf.
2 Id.
3 Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
4 Id.

5 The editorial page of the New York Times announced on January 28, "As
scrutiny turns from accountants to lawyers in this scandal, the legal profession
should be looking for ways to assure Americans that when fraudulent activities are
under way that threaten their livelihoods, their investments and their pensions,
lawyers will be on their side, not on the side of the criminals." Enron and the Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at A14. This was followed by that master of fair
play and balanced judgment, William Safire who opined "[Vinson & Elkins] replaced
their shingle with a doormat-but have you heard a disapproving peep from any bar
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has simply thrown the lawyers in with the outside directors and
auditors without any regard for the different responsibilities and
roles each of these three groups have, yet these lawyers should
know better. As a result of this guilt by association, the
Commission recklessly charges lawyers with failing "to avert"
and failing "to discover," when it very well knows that it would
be the most extraordinary of circumstances where either duty
would or should apply to lawyers, while both would and should
apply quite comfortably to auditors. 6 Neither are lawyers in the
"condoning" business. Maybe I have missed something, but I
know of nothing in the public record that concludes that lawyers
7
created the "grossest" of "manipulation and fraud."
The reckless, unsubstantiated charges do not end there.
Next we are told, again lumping the lawyers in with the
auditors, that "[o]utside professionals hired by the corporationparticularly its accountants and lawyers-faced increasing
pressures of consolidation and global competition, and they
found it necessary to compete more keenly to identify ways to
enhance their relationships with their corporate clients."8 As
law firms grew larger, "the need increased to put in place
internal controls that would allow those firms to assure the
necessary quality controls and independent judgment."9 As a
result, the self interest of corporate executives in aggressive
accounting and "assuming business risks were not tempered by
the checks and balances which the general corporate governance
scheme expected from outside directors and professional firms
engaged ...to provide independent review and advice." 10
Again a description that sounds like what the accountants
have been up to-with no citations and no examples. Such
descriptions are nothing more than purely speculative musings
on causation and a broad-brush indictment of lawyers along with
everyone else without regard to the fact that lawyers are
supposed to identify with their clients and establish
relationships with them, a far different role than what we seek
from independent auditors. In the same paragraph, for example,
we are informed that "[q]uestionable treatment of financial
association?" William Safire, 'You Wuz Robbed!, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2002, at A27.
6 ABA Report, supra note 1, at 7.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 8.
9 Id.

10

Id. at 8-9.
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information evaded audit screens,"' yet nowhere is there any
recognition that is a problem of the accountants, not anything
that should be laid at the feet of lawyers, let alone serve as a
basis for changing the rules governing our profession's obligation
of client confidentiality.
Buried in a footnote is an admission that should have been
contained in the first paragraph of the Commission's report
regarding its proposed changes in the ethical rules. We are told
that the Task Force has not attempted to determine the legal,
ethical, or moral responsibility of any individual person or
organization associated with any particular failure of corporate
governance. Actually, it is worse than that. The Commission
does not even disclose any factual inquiry it made into these
financial debacles. But without some investigation, factual
conclusions and at least tentative views on whether lawyers
violated any legal obligations and, more important, any ethical
rules, how can we begin to conclude that our rules require any
changes and, if so, what the dimensions of the changes should
be? One thing is for sure: the last thing the profession should
rely upon as a basis for any change is the hysterical response to
Enron by politicians and the press, both of whom have
demonstrated nothing other than irresponsibility in their
wholesale charges of misdeeds. Sadly, the Cheek Commission
now echoes these charges.
Instead
of demonstrating
a
foundation
for
its
recommendations, the Commission simply and blithely observes
that "[flor many years the ABA has studied and formulated
policies designed to encourage lawyers to promote corporate
responsibility."1 2 The report then concludes-drum roll please"[r]ecent criticism of lawyers' conduct demonstrates that this
study and formulation of policy has not yet achieved its objective
and must be a continuing effort." 13
First, although I believe in corporate responsibility and
think that all lawyers should encourage such responsibility, I am
not exactly sure that the goal of lawyers is supposed to be the
promotion of corporate responsibility. The subtle but critical
questions include the following: first, how far are lawyers

11Id. at 9.
12 Id. at 12.
13 Id. (emphasis added).
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supposed to go in promoting corporate responsibility, and second,
who should be responsible for corporate irresponsibility?
As to the former, a lawyer fulfills the his or her duty by
remonstrating with the client to do the right thing. But the
limitations on even this requirement should be recognized In
many cases, the right thing is not absolutely clear. Should a
drug manufacturer market a product that saves hundreds of
lives but has serious side effects? Should a company use off
balance sheet financing or enter into a risky but potentially
lucrative joint venture or hire a controversial but intriguing
CEO?
Furthermore, in so many decisions made by
organizational clients, right or wrong appears to play no role,
unless of course, with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, things don't
turn out quite as well as everyone hoped they would.
Lawyers are merely advisors. They are neither guarantors
of corporate good conduct nor are they particularly well suited
for making any judgment as to a whole host of matters that
corporate officers and directors have to decide.
The problem with the Commission's approach was
highlighted in a deeply flawed speech by Harvey Pitt last
February in Puerto Rico when he mistakenly argued that a
lawyer's duty was to act like a super board of directors of the
organizational client and to refuse to permit the company's
officers and directors from pursuing a course the lawyer thought
was not in the best interests of the shareholders.
Pitt
mistakenly argued that a corporate lawyer represents the
14
shareholders.
Pitt asserted that when lawyers receive direction from
corporate management, the lawyers "must be satisfied that
objectives management asks them to pursue truly are intended
to, and do, further the interests of the company and its
shareholders." 5 Up until I heard Pitt speak, it had always been
my understanding that it was the directors and officers who had
the obligation to decide what was in the best interests of the
company. That is what they were elected to do. That is what the
law requires them to do. Thus, directors and officers are
accountable to the shareholders if they fail in that endeavor.
14 Former SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks at the SEC Speaks Conference (Feb. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Pitt Remarks], available at http://www.iasplus.com
/resource/pitt02O2.pdf.

15 Id.
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As to the second question-how liable should lawyers beunlike the vast liability the Cheek Commission would create for
lawyers, it is my view that only the directors and officers of the
organization, not the organization's lawyer, should be held liable
if it turns out that the decisions of the directors and officers, of
which the lawyer was aware and which the lawyer may have
very well opposed, turns out to be more than simply a bad
business judgment but also a breach of the securities laws, of the
directors' and officers' fiduciary duty, or a similar violation, to
echo the now sacred words of Sarbanes-Oxley. Unless the
lawyer aids and abets the misconduct there is simply no basis for
creating liability for the lawyer advisor unless the goal is to force
the lawyer to substitute the lawyer's judgment for that of the
client's duly elected officers and directors.
Second, I take a back seat to no one in urging the bar to
stand perpetually prepared to reevaluate our rules. The Ethics
2000 Commission, of which I was a part, spent five years at the
task, and the completion of its work does not mean the effort
should not be taken up anew.
But the Commission's premise for this effort is non-existent.
How does the Commission know present policies were
inadequate to the task? Certainly, recent criticism demonstrates
nothing. Some of the criticism, like the Commission's, has
simply been a case of lumping the lawyers in with everyone else.
Some of it has occurred because lawyers are popular scapegoats.
Some of it has occurred because Congressmen, who gleefully
accepted Enron campaign contributions while actively
encouraging broad-based deregulation of the energy sector,
hoped to divert attention from themselves. So one hopes the
Commission is not telling us our rules must be changed simply
because lawyers have been criticized.
This should be
particularly so because our rules governing confidentiality are
regularly subject to criticism, criticism from those who want to
change lawyers from representatives of their clients to advocates
for something they call the public good, a change that in reality
would destroy the relationship between lawyer and client.
Moreover, such criticism, no matter how strident, makes the
need for confidentiality in the lawyer-client relationship no less
critical and no less worthy of a vigorous defense.
If the Commission is going to recommend changes, then the
Commission, it seems to me, must first demonstrate that a)
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those lawyers who are accused of wrongdoing did not violate our
present rules; b) their conduct caused or wrongfully exacerbated
the harm; c) if the rules were changed in the way the
Commission suggests, the harm that occurred would have been
prevented; and d) the changes in the rules proposed by the
Commission will do more good than harm, in other words, that
in preventing the next Enron, we are not creating different
mischief.
The Commission has provided us with none of that. The
Commission simply reiterates the soundly and correctly rejected
misguided arguments of the Ethics 2000 Commission. We are
told once again that most states do not follow the ABA Model
Rules. We knew that in August 2001, and what we thought then
is just as true today: when it comes to important principles,
when it comes to leadership, the ABA does not count noses.
Rather we do what is best for our clients and the system of
justice.
Confidentiality is the second leg of the tripod of core values
that support our professional ethic. We say we are committed to
the confidentiality of our clients because, without it, we are
deeply concerned-for good reason-that our clients will not
share with us their innermost secrets and will view their lawyers
with suspicion and distrust. To maintain the sanctity of the
lawyer-client relationship, the exceptions to confidentiality
crafted into our rules must be as narrowly drawn as possible.
This the present rules do. The only exceptions to confidentiality
that we maintain are the preservation of life, the prevention of
serious bodily harm, 16 candor to the tribunal, 17 and the
establishment of a claim or defense of the lawyer against the
client.' 8
But now, if this proposal is adopted, whole new
categories of disclosure will not only be possible but also
required! In order to prevent, mitigate, or rectify a client fraud
in which the lawyer's services have been employed,
confidentiality will now be the grist for the disclosure mill.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2002) (noting that the "lawyer may reveal information... to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
bodily harm").
17 Id.
18 Id. at R. 3.3 ("If a lawyer... has offered material evidence and the lawyer
comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures,
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.").
16
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The proponents of this proposal argue that lawyer services
should not be misused in this way. That proposition certainly
sounds reasonable enough, until it is recognized that the
proposed rule both starts from a false premise and at the same
time creates more likelihood for lawyers to be held liable than if
the rule remained as it is.
The false premise is that when a lawyer is dealing with
client fraud it will be apparent on its face. It is so easy to say the
words "when a lawyer uncovers fraud, she should be able to
disclose it."19 But, fraud does not appear that way except in the
rarest of cases. Facts are ambiguous, hindsight is 20-20, and the
ability of a lawyer to identify a good fraud is at a very low order
of magnitude. That is why it's called fraud.
The liability-creating effect will occur when lawyers, who no
longer will have the shield of Rule 1.6's 2 0 prohibition on
disclosure of confidential information, become defendants in
cases where it will be argued that they knew or, far more likely,
should have known about their client's fraud and were therefore
required to take steps to save the victims of the fraud. While the
rules' preamble provides that they do not necessarily establish
the standard of care, all it will take will be one expert witness
lawyer, perhaps someone from the "Commission, to assert from
the witness stand that violation of the new Rule 1.6 should give
rise to civil liability since the Commission urged adoption of the
21
rule to protect the public."
Most important, however, is the injection into the clientlawyer relationship of this requirement for whistle blowing, an
opportunity that must be exercised because of the concerns
counsel may have if counsel guesses wrong. The client-lawyer
relationship is fragile enough; this additional impediment to
trust should not be added to the mix. Its effect on full disclosure
by the client to the lawyer-the essential purpose of having a
rule governing confidentiality in the first place-is incalculable.
at R. 1.6
"A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client.. .to establish a claim or defense ...in a controversy between the lawyer and- client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim
against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or
to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client"

19 Id.

Id.
20 Id.
21 ABA

Report, supra note 1, at 24.
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For certain, if this rule is adopted, lawyers will have far fewer
opportunities than they enjoy today to remonstrate with their
clients to do the right thing.
In the end, the only new reason the Commission offers for
this change is that the ABA is more out of step today than it was
in 2001 because of "public demand that lawyers play a greater
role in promoting corporate responsibility."22 Furthermore,
changing our confidentiality rules now will be "an effective
response to the problems that have provoked public criticism of
the bar."23 It may be true that the public will give us all Miss
Congeniality awards for compromising confidentiality. We may
even win regulator of the year awards from President Bush if we
are required to disclose otherwise confidential information.
Indeed, given the wonderful combination of the ambiguity of
information and the need to avoid liability, we can expect
lawyers either to become turncoats on a regular basis or to
expose themselves to unlimited liability for their commitment to
confidentiality. But, society will have lost so much more than it
has gained. Furthermore, we will have lost our role as lawyers
doing good within the cloak of confidentiality, remonstrating
with clients-who are open and willing to share information with
us-to do the right thing.
What really worries me is that this shocking proposalrequiring lawyers to blow the whistle on their clients-is really
just a stalking horse that the Commission knows this proposal
will never fly but that by offering it for its shock value, everyone
at the ABA will enthusiastically endorse a compromise just to
avoid the havoc the Cheek Commission would create in the
profession with its proposed mandatory rule. But the reasons for
rejecting the Ethics 2000 proposal are just as true today; nothing
about Enron and its progeny justifies turning lawyers into either
permissive or mandatory regulators, blowing the whistle on their
clients whenever they are forced to worry about their own
Cheek-Commission-created liability.
In my view, more is at stake with these proposed
amendments to Rule 1.624 than just issues of confidentiality, as
important as they are. What I see is a complete redefinition of
what it means to be a lawyer. Not only will this proposal change
22
23
24

Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 33.
See supra notes 16 and 19.
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the way the representation is formed but also the entire course
of conduct between lawyer and client. Today I look my clients in
the eye, urge them to trust me, explain the confidentiality that
cloaks the relationship and reiterate again and again how
important it is that I know everything. The truth is my stock in
trade. Tell me the truth, and I can advise the client to the best
of my ability. What I don't want is surprise, half stories, or
convenient omissions. Those are the gremlins that play havoc to
my ability to provide the best services for my clients. Mostly I
succeed. Yet even with my attempt at a trust-generating speech,
clients don't tell me everything. I do, however, get a lot closer to
the ideal than I would if I didn't start the representation with
my little speech about my commitment to keep my client's
confidences and how I am on the client's side.
Now, under the proposed rule, the client is entitled to be told
that anytime I know or should know that the client is about to
commit a fraud or has already committed one that I can rectify
or mitigate, I reserve the right to disclose my client's
wrongdoing-the only assumption consistent with my duty to
communicate with client under Model Rule 1.4.25 My clients and
I, henceforth, are going to start off on the wrong foot, and things
will simply deteriorate from the formation of the relationship. Is
there anything about the required speech I will now have to give
my clients that is likely to foster trust, encourage full disclosure,
and arm me with the tools to provide the client with the best
advice? Hardly. Rather, we will have created a situation in
which clients will be discouraged from seeking legal advice at all.
When they do so, they will certainly-to a far greater extent
than they presently do-withhold some key information because
they will be concerned that disclosure will turn their trusted
legal advisor into the best cop on the beat. Actually, it will be
worse than that because, unlike the cop who doesn't catch the

25 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4
"A lawyer shall: (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent... ;(2) reasona-

bly consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives
are to be accomplished; (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the
status if the matter; (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and (5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on
the lawyer's conduct."

20031

IT TAKES MORE TO LOSE OUR WAY

criminal, the lawyer who fails to turn in the miscreant client will
be set up to suffer her own kind of liability hell.
Though I could cite dozens of hypotheticals to demonstrate
the point, let me provide a few. Imagine a public company client
is engaged in negotiations with its primary bank for a renewal of
a line of credit. They are not going well. Big Bank announces it
will not renew the line. The client thinks the line can be
replaced by Little Bank and asks Lawyer to help negotiate the
new line. Lawyer explains that the client is probably obliged to
disclose the news about Big Bank. The client explains that in
the current climate, doing so would be a disaster. The client's
CEO says the company will wait one week to determine if a new
line can be put in place. Lawyer explains the risk. CEO says it's
one the company must run. "It's in the best interest of the
shareholders." Under the Cheek Commission proposal, not only
would the lawyer take this judgment away from the client but
also the lawyer would be required to disclose the Big Bank's
decision to protect the lawyer from liability for a judgment the
CEO should be free-indeed, must be free-to make without any
exposure on the part of the lawyer if the second bank does not
come through and the company gets second-guessed for failing to
disclose Big Bank's position one week earlier.
Similarly, imagine a lawyer asked to defend a
pharmaceutical company in liability claims arising from a new
miracle drug. In the course of the lawyer's investigation, he
learns of a company lab employee who believes the drug causes
liver damage. When the lawyer asks the head of research about
these views, lawyer is told the lab guy is a nut and his charges
baseless. Under the Cheek Commission proposal, the lawyer not
only would be required to determine whether the nut
characterization is true, a tough task for a lawyer who hardly
has any expertise on this topic, but also disclose this nut's
opinion if the lawyer thinks there is any chance the liability
cases might be lost and some shareholder will come along
contending that the liver problem should have been disclosed
sooner, the lawyer should have known about it, and the lawyer
failed to disclose it.
To cite just one more example, assume a company asks their
lawyer to handle the dismissal of a 60-year-old plant
superintendent. "Don't you have an age discrimination problem
getting rid of old Tom?" "We've thought about that, but we think
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our documentation of his repeated performance deficiencies will
justify the decision." "I sure hope you are right," lawyer intones,
then wonders whether he does not have a disclosure obligation to
protect the shareholders from possible damage to the company if
a successful lawsuit is brought. "Now that you've got me
involved," the lawyer observes, "I'm afraid you can't fire ol' Tom."
The substitution of "should have known" for "knows," while
treated cavalierly by the Commission, is almost as destructive of
the lawyer-client relationship as the Commission's proposed
evisceration of confidentiality under Rule 1.6. It is one thing for
a lawyer to be asked to do something in response to what the
lawyer knows; changing the standard to "should have known"
has dramatic deleterious consequences.
This is because of the power of 20-20 hindsight. If it turns
out that by some action the client engaged in a fraud or made a
misrepresentation and the usual suspects are lined up to be held
responsible, if the lawyer was on the scene, it will be asserted
that the lawyer should have known, even if the lawyer did not
know what was about to occur.
Why wasn't the lawyer
suspicious? Why didn't the lawyer ask more questions? Seek
documentation?
Check further?
Contact third parties?
Furthermore, as with Rule 1.6,26 the Commission will have
created a whole new area of potential lawyer liability, holding
lawyers financially responsible systematically for the damage
flowing from the misdeeds, or even bad judgment, of their
clients.
If that were all that was at stake-a huge increase in
premiums for lawyers and the creation of additional deep
pockets to respond to corporate errors--one could be accused of
simply professional self-protection, though one could properly
ask the question why lawyers would recommend for their
professional colleagues self-immolation. That is far from all that
is at stake. Rather, this proposal, too, would change the lawyerclient relationship. Instead of lawyers taking their instructions
from their clients and permitting the client to determine the
scope of the representation, with this new audit function,
lawyers, rather than simply providing the requested services,
will engage in a wholesale campaign of checking to learn what
someone, someday will argue they should have known. Instead
of working with their clients, lawyers will treat them with
26 See supra notes 16 and 19.
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skepticism at best and suspicion at worst. Instead of reasonable
cost for drawing up a contract or assisting with a merger,
lawyers will add millions to their fees as they perform due
diligence, not simply when it is currently required for initial
public offerings, but for all matters handled for the
organizational client. What a wonderful trifecta of salutary
results the Commission's "should have known" standard will
create: mutual suspicion between lawyer and client, higher fees
for clients, and expanded liability for lawyers.
If I did not know better, I would have assumed the
Commissioners were in the hip pocket of the Legal Malpractice
Section of the Association of Trial Lawyers. But I am sure they
are not. No, rather the Commission has simply gotten caught up
in the frenzy that was Enron, and in its attempt to do something
to respond to the avalanche of unwanted public criticism, the
Commission lurched into offering a minor change of "knows" to
"should have known" that turns out to be both particularly bad
public policy and flawed professional responsibility.
Our profession has taken two body blows from the Big Five,
now the Final Four.2 7 The first was their attempt to take over
the practice of law with their brilliant idea of forming multidisciplinary practices (MDPs). 28 They almost sold us that bill of
goods. The ABA MDP Commission adopted proposals that would
have destroyed our core values, succumbing to the Big Five's
frantic search for new worlds to conquer masquerading as client
demand for one-stop shopping. 29 It took the fallout from Enron
to demonstrate what a flawed idea that was.
Now Arthur Andersen has brought us Enron and WorldCom;
other members of the Big Five have brought us Adelphia, Qwest,
and others. The hysteria generated by the apparent complicity
between management and their company's auditors has also
brought us charges that somehow the lawyers are also
responsible for what occurred and that the cure for that
27 The five largest audit firms, or "Big 5 firms," were Arthur Anderson LLP,
Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG LLP, and Pricewaterhouse
Coopers LLP. Since the Enron debacle, Arthur Andersen has filed for bankruptcy,
changing the firms' nickname to the "Final 4."
28 See Geanne Rosenberg, Big Five: Accounting Legal Affiliates Criticizes ABA
Proposal to Restrict MDPs, NAT'L L.J., July 25, 2000, available at
http://ww-w.law.com (discussing the debate over multidisciplinary practices).
29 See American Bar Association, Report to the House of Delegates, 2000 A.B.A
COMM'N MULTI. PRACT., http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfmalrep2000.html.
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responsibility is new rules and expanded liability for our
profession.
Let us deflect this body blow as well. Not until those who
seek change demonstrate why our rules are flawed and how the
rule changes they propose would do more good than harm should
we even consider such proposals.
This, alas, the Cheek
Commission has not and cannot do. So as with the not very
lamented MDP proposals, let us give the Commission's proposal
the respectful burial it deserves.

